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Abstract 
 
Using a dynamic model of unionism and wage determination we find that the unobserved factors that 
influence union membership also affect wages. The estimates suggest that UK trade unions still play a 
non-negligible, albeit diminishing, role in wage formation. It appears that the greater impact of un 
observables in determining individual union propensity concerning the second period under analysis, 
versus past unionisation experience, implies that those remaining in unions during (1997-2002) gain most 
from their sorting decision. The significant contribution of unobserved heterogeneity renders the total union 
wage differential highly variable across individuals. The endogeneity correction procedure employed yields 
a discernible pattern of the estimated union wage effect relative to OLS and Fixed effects. This is in line 
with Robinson (1989a) and Vella and Verbeek (1998) and refutes the pessimistic conclusions reached by 
Freeman and Medoff (1982) and Lewis (1986) that endogeneity correction methodologies do not 
contribute to our understanding of the union wage effect puzzle. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE JOINT DETERMINATION OF UNION STATUS
AND UNION WAGE EFFECTS
This paper is concerned with the estimation of union wage di¤erentials in the
United Kingdom during 1991-2003 using data from the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS). We are essentially exploring the question of how observationally
equivalent employeespecuniary rewards diverge in union and non-union employ-
ment.
It is hard to conceptualise a realistic scenario in which the unobserved deter-
minants of the sorting decision regarding the two sectors would not a¤ect wages.
Therefore, we cannot readily ignore to encompass how the unobserved individual
heterogeneity underlying the union/non-union decision is rewarded in the respective
sectors (see for instance Robinson, 1989a; Vella and Verbeek, 1998).
The primary complication arises because union sector employees di¤er from non-
union sector employees in unobserved ways, unobserved individual heterogeneity,
thus resulting in biased estimates of the union wage e¤ect. As Freeman (1984)
notes the ubiquitous phrases in literally any paper in the eld stress that:
"You should make a selectivity bias correction...simultaneously determine union
status and economic outcomes...develop an unobservables model...Use longitudinal
data" (p.2).
The general consensus by many researchers in the past was that cross-sectional
OLS analyses of the union wage e¤ect are contaminated by the selectivity3 of the
union sector employees that leads to a positive correlation between the error term
and union membership status hence, inating the union wage e¤ect (see Abowd
and Farber, 1982; Freeman, 1984).
Longitudinal estimates of the union wage e¤ect are biased downward and are
expected to be lower than the corresponding cross-sectional estimates reecting
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity bias. Of course, longitudinal estimators
of the union wage impact do not provide a research panacea. This is due to the
potentially substantial impact of measurement or misclassication error of the union
membership variable on longitudinal estimates of the union e¤ect (see Freeman,
1984).4
While there was little disagreement that union membership status is not ex-
ogenous (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Duncan and Leigh, 1985; Robinson, 1989a) authors
such as Freeman and Medo¤ (1982) and Lewis (1986) have reached the pessimistic
conclusion that there is no discernible pattern to the estimates of the union wage
impact, many were considered to be suspiciously high or low, and endogeneity cor-
rection methodologies have contributed little to our understanding of the union
wage di¤erential puzzle (Robinson, 1989a, p.640).
Upon summarising the then existing literature Robinson (1989a) concludes that
the outcome is conicting: cross-sectional methods (such as Inverse Mills Ra-
tio and Instrumental Variables) produced an upward adjustment as opposed to
OLS, whereas longitudinal (di¤erencing) methods produced a downward adjust-
3The selectivity argument assumes that given that unions are able to establish wage premia
within the unionised sector, prot maximising employers will select the most productive workers.
4 In fact, the union membership variable constructed for the twelve years of the survey su¤ers
from a certain degree of discontinuity (refer to Chrysanthou, 2007). The two alternative questions
available in the survey do allow us to construct a continuous measure of union membership.
The individual responses from the two alternative membership questions and the union coverage
outcomes can be compared in order to detect any potential measurement error and its impact on
the union wage e¤ects (see Swa¢ eld, 2001).
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ment (Robinson, 1989a, p.640). Though, some researchers employing longitudinal
data sets attribute the resulting reduction in the union wage e¤ect to xed e¤ects
of higher quality workers present within the unionised sector this is not consistent
with the cross-section studies employing IMR or IVE methods to deal with such
e¤ects (Robinson, 1989, p.658).
Given a comparative advantage interpretation of the unobserved individual het-
erogeneity e¤ects, the endogeneity corrected estimates of the union wage e¤ect can
actually be higher than their uncorrected OLS counterparts. The selectivity argu-
ment (e.g. Abowd and Farber, 1982; Freeman, 1984) will only produce an upward
bias for OLS under a hierarchical notion of unobserved individual heterogeneity
(Robinson, 1989a, p.665).
Estimation of union wage di¤erentials using longitudinal data requires control-
ling for the endogeneity of union membership status. Fixed e¤ects and Instrumental
Variables estimators assume that this endogeneity is individual-specic and xed
and are thus restrictive in their treatment of unobserved individual heterogeneity.5
The Fixed e¤ects estimator can provide consistent estimates of the union wage
impact to the extent that the individual heterogeneity that triggers the endogeneity
of union status runs solely through the individual xed e¤ects which are further
constrained to be equal in the two sectors (see Robinson, 1989a; Vella and Verbeek,
1998).
Instrumental Variables procedures (e.g. Hausman and Taylor, 1981) can also be
put into use although these estimation methodologies, in their generic form, do not
account for endogeneity operating through the other error components. Further,
Instrumental Variables methods constrain unobserved individual heterogeneity to
be identical across sectors. This enforces the constraint that the ordering of em-
ployeesproductivity in each sector is invariant to sector (see Vella and Verbeek,
1998, 1999a).
In response to this, we employ the estimation procedure o¤ered by Vella and
Verbeek (1998, 1999b) to explicitly identify the di¤erent sources of endogeneity of
union membership status via the decomposition of the endogeneity underlying union
membership status into an individual-specic component and an individual/time-
specic e¤ect.
This is a two-step estimation methodology of a simultaneous error component
model with an endogenous explanatory variable that is also the basis of the selec-
tion rule. It extends the existing cross-sectional estimators (e.g. Lee, 1978 and
Heckman, 1979) via the exploitation of the panel nature of the data to separate the
type of unobserved heterogeneity causing the endogeneity/selection bias. By intro-
ducing dynamics it enables the isolation of individual e¤ects from state dependence
(see Vella and Verbeek, 1999b, p.245).
A major advantage of this approach is its relative computational simplicity, as
opposed to maximum likelihood, and although two-step procedures are in general
ine¢ cient (see Newey, 1987) this method does provide initial consistent estimators
for a limited information framework (LIML) approach so that asymptotically e¢ -
cient estimators can be obtained at one iteration (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999b,
pp.240-241).
In this paper we wish to establish whether UK trade unions still play a role in
wage formation following the introduction of the successive (1980, 1982, 1988 and
5For a detailed discussion on this issue refer to Robinson (1989a,b) and Vella and Verbeek
(1999a).
3
1990) Employment Acts targeted towards weakening their bargaining strength. Fur-
ther, we are interested in exploring the role of unobserved individual heterogeneity
in the union/non-union decision and the manner in which it is rewarded in the
two sectors. Finally, we wish to investigate whether the economic sorting structure
governing the entry into the two sectors provides a discernible pattern of the endo-
geneity corrected estimates relative to the uncorrected estimates of the union wage
e¤ect.
The empirical results indicate that trade unions in the UK still play a non-
negligible, albeit diminishing, role in wage formation. The estimated union wage
di¤erentials are consistent with the recent estimates of Blanchower and Bryson
(2007) using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). While during (1991-1996)
the average contribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity to the wages of
male and female union members, under the sorting structure supported by the es-
timates, is negative the corresponding contribution is positive in the (1997-2002)
estimates. Further, the signicant contribution of unobserved heterogeneity ren-
ders the total union wage di¤erential highly variable across individuals. Finally,
the endogeneity correction procedure employed yields a discernible pattern of the
estimated union wage impact relative to OLS and Fixed e¤ects. This is in line with
Robinson (1989a) and Vella and Verbeek (1998) and refutes the pessimistic conclu-
sions reached by Freeman and Medo¤ (1982) and Lewis (1986) in their inuential
surveys.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the econometric
model; Section 3 the estimation procedure; Section 4 analyses the estimation results;
and nally Section 5 concludes.
2. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF UNIONISM AND WAGE DETERMINATION
Equation (1) outlines the primary wage equation and assumes that individuals
sort themselves into their preferred sector (union/non-union) on the basis of wages
which are determined by observed and unobserved attributes and their respective
prices. The potential wage corresponding to individual i employed in sector j,
in time period t is given by wj;it. The non-unionised and unionised sectors are
denoted by j = f0; 1g respectively,  is an unknown parameter vector and xit
is the conventional vector of personal and industrial characteristics which is also
inclusive of time dummies. The unobserved random components of the employees
wage are given by (j;i; "j;it) and the usual error component structure assumes
j;i s iidN(0; 2) and "j ;its iidN(0; 2"):
wj;it = 
0
j;txit + j;i + "j;it (1)
t = 1; :::; T ; i = 1; :::; N ; j = f0; 1g
Employment within a unionised establishment is also contingent on the em-
ployers willingness to hire him/her (see Abowd and Farber, 1982). The major
limitation of the estimation methodology employed here is that it does not suf-
ciently control for employer characteristics while on the other hand, individual
employees attributes are allowed to be an integral part of the employers deci-
sion making process. While in the estimated models presented employer attributes
are captured through the industrial classication dummies and establishment size
controls these are not adequate in order to assign any specic e¤ects purely to
unobserved heterogeneity (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998, p.164).
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The dynamic reduced form model depicting the decision of an individual to join
either the unionised or non-unionised sector is provided in equation (2). The bene-
ts of employment within the unionised sector are captured by the latent variable
Uit. The union membership status of an individual i in period t, is indicated by
the dummy variable Uit.
The unknown parameters to be estimated are (01; 2)
0 and the composite error
term it captures the unobserved individual heterogeneity underlying the union
membership decision and is decomposed into an individual-specic component #i
and an individual time-specic e¤ect it and wit is the logarithm of the gross average
hourly wage:6
Uit = 
0
1xit + 2Ui;t 1 + #i + it (2)
Uit = I(U

it i 0)
wit = wj;it if Uit = j
Denote ej;it= j;i + "j;it and it = #i + it, let i be a T vector of it and
xi = [xi1; :::; xiT ]
0. Assuming that:
i j xi  iidN(0; 2#ii0 + 2I) (3)
Efej;it j xi;ig = 1it + 2  i (4)
where
 
 i =
1
T
PT
t=1 it, i is a T dimensional vector of ones and (1; 2) are
unknown constants to be estimated.
Expression (3) enforces normality and a strict error components structure on
the reduced form model for union membership7 and precludes any form of auto-
correlation in it while equation (4) permits heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
in "j;it but imposes the strict exogeneity8 of xit (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999b,
pp.242-244).
Potential seniority and non-pecuniary benets can be su¢ ciently strong mo-
tives for individuals to remain within the unionised sector, irrespective of wage
changes, and this introduces state dependence in the model (see Vella and Ver-
beek, 1998). The inclusion of a lagged union membership status variable in the
reduced form model prevents the error components from incorrectly capturing the
dynamics which should be credited to lagged union membership. Regrettably, it
is not possible to include dynamics coming through the lagged dependent variable
in the wage equation as well. An alternative estimator proposed by Arellano et al
(1997) permits for lagged latent dependent variables to enter both the primary and
reduced form equations linearly. Nevertheless this is constrained to models with
Tobit types of censoring (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999b, p.242).
The random components (j;i; i); ("j;it; it) in equations (1; 2) denote an individual-
specic e¤ect, and an individual/time-specic e¤ect, respectively. It is assumed that
these are independently and identically distributed drawings from a multivariate
normal distribution, where every e¤ect is potentially correlated with its counterpart,
of the same dimension, in the other equation (Krishnakumar, 1996, p.230). More
6Logarithm of weekly wage divided by usual paid hours (including overtime).
7Note that testing for non-normality in the reduced form model for union membership can be
quite di¢ cult computationally.
8The errors are assumed to be independent of future and lagged values of xit.
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specically the four covariances (j;; j;") are allowed to be non-zero.9 These
covariances indicate that the random components in the wage equation are poten-
tially correlated with the random components in the union membership equation
and this is precisely what produces the potential endogeneity of union membership
status in the primary equation.
The covariances convey valuable information about the form of sorting into the
two sectors (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a). Note that the (i;8 i = 1; :::; N) are
constructed so that their average value for union employees is positive while their
average value for non-union employees is negative. For tractability assume that the
endogeneity is taken to operate purely via the individual-specic e¤ects (j;i; i).
In the case that either covariance between (; ) is non-zero then the unobserved
factors that determine union membership inuence wages as well.
A hierarchical sorting structure occurs when both covariances are positive (1;0
 0) so that individuals with high values of  are, on average, the best employees in
terms of their endowment of unobserved productivity, irrespective of whether they
are located in the union or non-union sector. A comparative advantage or posi-
tive sorting structure occurs when employees perform di¤erently in the two sectors
and sort themselves appropriately (1;0  0). This implies a negative association
between the relative productivity in the two sectors and demands that the contribu-
tion of unobserved individual heterogeneity raises wages in both sectors (i.e. 1;
i 0; 0; h 0). One should bear in mind that 1;0 cannot be estimated directly.
Note that solely a degenerate hierarchical structure, imposing perfect correlation
between sector-specic skills, can meet the strict and restrictive requirement of the
equality of the two covariances imposed by either of the Instrumental Variables or
the restricted Control Function estimators. A comparative advantage structure is
precluded a priori (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a).
To estimate the union wage di¤erential we enforce the restriction that the re-
turns to observed characteristics are both time and sector invariant. The wage
equation (eq:1) then becomes:
wit = 
0xit + Uit + eit (5)
eit = Uit(1;i + "1;it) + (1  Uit)(0;i + "0;it)
3. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Following Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999b) we start with equation (5) which
is made conditional on the t-dimensional vector Ui, and the vector of exogenous
variables xit:
E(wit j xit; Ui) = 0E(xitj xit; Ui)+E(Uitj xit; Ui)+E(j;ij xit; Ui)+E("j;itj xit; Ui)
(6)
Estimation of the reduced form model for union membership (eq:2), provides the
estimates of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. This is a dynamic Random
e¤ects Probit model with a likelihood function:

i
Z

t


0	it + i

Uit


 
0	it + i

1 Uit 1

(=)d (7)
9The covariances between the e¤ects in the union/ non-union wage equations are not specied,
whereas all remaining covariances are set to zero.
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where,  = (01; 2)
0, 	it = [xit; Ui;t 1], and (; ) correspond to the cumulative
probability and density functions of the standard Normal distribution.
The inclusion of the lagged union membership variable as a regressor in (eq:2)
gives rise to the problem of initial conditions (refer to Heckman, 1981a). The initial
conditions problem occurs when the initial value of the dependent variable is corre-
lated with unobserved individual heterogeneity. The presence of individual-specic
e¤ects i clearly invalidates the assumption of exogeneity of union membership
status in the rst period of the survey.
Heckmans solution to the initial conditions problem approximates the reduced
form marginal probability of the initial state by a Probit function which has as its
argument all of the available pre-sample information on the exogenous variables
(Heckman, 1981b, p.188).
We employ Stewarts (2006) Stata command, -redprob-, to implement Heck-
mans (1981b) estimator of the dynamic Random e¤ects Probit model for union
membership.10
The conditional expectations in equation (6), the estimates of the unobserved
heterogeneity, can be expressed as:11
E(j;ijxit; Ui) = j;

T
2 + T
2

E(
 
ij xit; Ui)

= j;Ci (8,9)
E("j;itjxit; Ui) = j;"

 2 E(itj xit; Ui) 
T2
2(
2
 + T
2
)
E(
 
ij xit; Ui)

= j;"Cit
The endogeneity correction terms (Ci; Cit) are added as additional terms in the
equation of primary interest to be estimated jointly with (0; ) in the second step
from conditional moment restrictions such as least squares based on (5). Under the
null hypothesis of no endogeneity (j; = j;" = 0), the conventional standard
errors can be used. Otherwise, the standard errors should be adjusted for het-
eroskedasticity and for the inclusion of the endogeneity correction terms (see Vella
and Verbeek, 1999b, pp.259-260).
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
We employ balanced panels of employees aged between 16-65 during (1991-1996
& 1997-2002) consisting of a full-time male employeessample and a full sample of
female employees (full-time and part-time). Part-time male employees are excluded
since the small gains in terms of sample size are more than outweighted by the costs
of a potential increase in the heterogeneity of the male samples. The female samples
can provide a comparison group against the male sample that could potentially
su¤er from selectivity bias. Note that the former is also prone to sample selection
bias caused by the labour market participation decision (see Swa¢ eld, 2001, p.439).
The estimated models presented in Tables (2-5) in Appendix III, include a set of
personal and industrial characteristics. All models, except the Fixed e¤ects (within)
10Employing Ormes (2001) two-step methodology the correlations between the initial condition
and the random e¤ect were all in excess of 0:8 in the light of which the inherent heteroskedas-
ticity of the residual component produces inconsistent parameter estimates. Wooldridges (2005)
estimator, extended by a standard probit estimator for the initial period to enable comparability
with Heckmans (1981b) estimator, produced an inferior log-likelihood since it doesnt incorporate
pre-sample information (for a detailed treatment refer to Chrysanthou, 2007).
11See Appendix I.
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estimates, are also inclusive of a set of time dummies. The set of explanatory vari-
ables included in the models were jointly statistically signicant in every reported
specication. The descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in Table 1,
Appendix III while those of the endogeneity correction terms are given in Tables
(6-9), Appendix III.
The unconditional male union wage di¤erential is approximately 4.5% and 4%
in the (1991-1996) and (1997-2002) samples, respectively, while, the corresponding
unconditional female union wage di¤erentials are approximately 14% and 11.9%.
Further, the descriptive statistics Tables reveal that females earn approximately
20.6% less than their male counterparts during (1991-1996) while, they earn approx-
imately 14.4% less during (1997-2002). Male union membership during (1997-2002)
has fallen by approximately 15.3% compared to the (1991-1996) male membership
level. The female union membership rate on the other hand, has actually risen by
approximately 9.5% so that by the last cross-section of the survey female unionisa-
tion rates converged to the level of male unionisation rates at a marginally higher
percentage.
Prior to embarking on the analysis of the estimated results a couple of issues
need to be addressed. Regarding the issue of identication, the non-linear mapping
from the reduced form union membership variables to the endogeneity correction
terms identies all parameters in the wage equation (5). Exclusion restrictions are
of course desirable though one should be cautious with remaining consistent with
the economics of trade union membership (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a).
The exclusion of lagged union membership status from the empirical counterpart
of (eq:5) identies the equation as long as 1 di¤ers from zero. Note that it is
assumed that the long-term advantages of union employment, whilst generating
persistence of union membership status, do not have a signicant impact on wages.
Thus, lagged union membership status is only expected to have a minor e¤ect on
current wages (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998, p.167).
Vella and Verbeek treat industry of employment as exogenous since their data
come from the Youth (male) sample National Longitudinal Survey. Citing the
results of Jovanovic and Mo¢ tt (1990) and Topel and Ward (1992) they argue
that although workers generally sort themselves into jobs on the basis of industry-
specic skills younger workers experience multiple job changes prior to entering
longer term employment arrangements. Occupational status on the other hand,
being a measure of ability, is treated as endogenous as it can contaminate the
conclusions concerning the role of unobserved individual heterogeneity (see Vella
and Verbeek 1998, pp.168-169).
However, the samples used in this study are fairly heterogeneous and consist
of employees aged between 16-65. Thus, assuming that industry of employment
is exogenous using the argument in the preceding paragraph is not as straightfor-
ward. Including occupational controls reduces the coe¢ cients on the xed individ-
ual e¤ects in most estimated models suggesting that a component of unobserved
heterogeneity underlying union status is correlated with occupational classication.
Nevertheless, to the extent that this was not found to a¤ect the union wage dif-
ferentials or the conclusions reached with regard to the role of the endogeneity
correction terms we opted to include occupational controls in the models.
Given that the industrial and occupational classications overlap to a certain
extent, our exclusion decision of either set of controls in the reduced form union
membership models was based on the convergence problems incurred in the max-
imum likelihood estimators (due to the given degree of collinearity). Concerning
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the exclusion of either set of controls in the primary wage regressions this was
based on the detection of non-normality. Higher-order terms of the latent e¤ects,
squared correction terms and their interactions with union status, were included in
the models in order to detect non-normality (see Pagan and Vella, 1989). Exclusion
of either set of the industrial and occupational classication controls was based on
minimising the joint statistical signicance of the higher-order terms. These are
reported only in the models where normality was an issue. The statistically signif-
icant higher order terms in most of the endogeneity corrected estimates in Tables
(2-5) indicate non-normality, an outcome which was not unexpected given the fairly
heterogeneous nature of the samples.
As expected a priori, including the occupational controls does change the coef-
cients of several personal characteristics variables since these variables are bound
to be correlated with occupational status. One should bear in mind, however, that
the set of personal and industrial variables included in the models only serve in
controlling for some observed heterogeneity and are not the focus of this study.
The latent e¤ects in the estimated wage regressions are linear functions of the cor-
responding latent e¤ects in the reduced form models for union membership. Hence,
the inclusion of the endogeneity correction terms complicates the interpretation of
the coe¢ cients on explanatory variables other than union membership.
The standard errors in the models inclusive of the endogeneity correction terms
need to be adjusted to account for the structure of the errors and the two-step
nature of the estimation procedure using the formulae provided in Newey (1984).
Otherwise the resulting standard errors will be deated and signicance levels over-
stated (see Heckman, 1979).
While we use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, in conjunction with all
estimation methodologies reported in Tables (2-5), we fail to account for the inclu-
sion of the generated regressors in the second step due to the complexity entailed in
computing the asymptotic covariance matrix of the second step estimator. Obtain-
ing boostrap standard errors via re-sampling the data is an attractive alternative
though this needs to be carried out for both estimation stages. Unfortunately, the
computational time involved in estimating the rst stage Random e¤ects Probit
models for union membership, using Stewarts (2006) maximum likelihood estima-
tor to account for the initial conditions problem, renders the boostrapping alterna-
tive prohibitive.12 Nevertheless since the generated endogeneity correction terms
are only jointly, as opposed to unilaterally, statistically signicant the impact on
the standard errors in the reported estimates should not be substantial.13
4.1. The Wage Regressions Under Hierarchical Sorting
To determine the sorting structure consistent with the data we begin with the
hierarchical sorting estimates that assume that the best employees, in terms of
12The rst stage maximum likelihood estimators require between 52-120 hours each, depending
on the model, to provide convergent results using a computer with normal capacity. The number
of iterations ranges from 7-14. Combining this with the boostrap option requires more than 72
hours for a single iteration. The only options reducing computational time to reasonable levels
would be to either conduct a pilot study with very few boostrap repetitions, in which case the
asymptotic validity of the results is questionable, or exclude the vast majority of the explanatory
variables in the rst stage regressions which would result in model misspecication.
13For instance, Vella and Verbeek (1998) report that failing to account for the inclusion of
strongly statistically signicant generated regressors in the second stage results in an underesti-
mation of the standard errors that ranges between 1-11%.
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their unobserved productivity, will receive a higher remuneration irrespective of
whether they are located in the union or non-union sector. Essentially then, under
this assumption the endogeneity correction terms are restricted to be invariant to
sector.
Regarding the (1991-1996) male and (1997-2002) female models the negative and
statistically signicant coe¢ cients on the individual-specic correction terms sug-
gest that employees who receive lower wages, upon conditioning on their attributes
and in the absence of trade unions, are those more likely to be trade union mem-
bers (refer to Tables 2, 5, respectively). The statistically signicant and negative
coe¢ cient on the individual time-variant e¤ect in the (1991-1996) female estimates
is also indicating that lower paid individuals, in the absence of trade unions, have
a higher propensity towards unionisation ceteris paribus (see Table 4).
However, concerning the (1997-2002) male estimates the positive and statisti-
cally signicant coe¢ cient on the individual-specic e¤ect, implies that male em-
ployees who receive higher wages, controlling for their characteristics and in the
absence of trade unions, are those more likely to be trade union members (refer to
Table 3).
Note that apart from the (1991-1996) female estimates (in Table 4) the individ-
ual time-variant e¤ects were not found to be unilaterally statistically signicant.
Thus, it seems that with the exception of the (1991-1996) female estimates, the
union e¤ects are mainly due to the individual-specic e¤ects. Nevertheless, all se-
lection terms were generally found to be jointly statistically signicant and this is
suggestive of selectivity bias.
The statistically signicant coe¢ cients on the time-variant individual e¤ects in
the (1991-1996) female estimates imply that Fixed e¤ects estimation is inappropri-
ate as the time varying endogeneity is not eliminated and continues to contaminate
the resulting estimates.
In all reported models the estimated union e¤ect under Fixed e¤ects assump-
tions is notably low (refer to Tables 2-5).14 This is consistent with the general
consensus in the union literature that the longitudinal estimates of the union wage
e¤ect are lower than the cross-sectional estimates (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Robinson,
1989a) and in line with the empirical ndings of authors such as Jakubson (1991)
and Vella and Verbeek (1998).
While, of course, there is no doubt regarding the question of the appropriateness
of the Fixed e¤ects approach in the female (1991-1996) model it could be argued
that joint, as opposed to unilateral, statistical signicance in the remaining models
weakens the argument. One should note, however, that even in the case whereby
unobserved heterogeneity is individual-specic, Fixed e¤ects impose the invariance
of heterogeneity rewards to sector and further that covariance  is constant across
sector (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998, pp.171-172).
The outcome that higher paid employees are less likely to seek union employ-
ment, apart from the (1997-2002) male estimates, is in line with insider-outsider
theories (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986) suggesting that groups of highly skilled em-
ployees can be seen as acting as a de facto union on its own since they cannot be
rapidly and costlessly replaced (see Blanchower el al, 1990). It is also consistent
with Abowd and Farbers (1982) argument that the standardisation of wage rates
14The only exception are the (1997-2002) male estimates (see Table 3) where the Fixed e¤ects
estimator provides a similar estimate of the union e¤ect to the hierarchical sorting estimate. This
is due to the very low statistical signicance of the individual time-variant e¤ects in both the
hierarchical and unrestricted estimates.
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via the bargaining process implies that workers with a high degree of human cap-
ital invested in themselves would be less prone to unionisation as it would entail
reduced human capital premia. Robinson (1989a) and Vella and Verbeek (1998)
in their studies also reach the conclusion that there is no empirical evidence that
better employees are chosen from a queue to join unions.
The result regarding the (1997-2002) male employeesremuneration and union
membership propensity could be explained by resorting to the reduced form es-
timates of union membership determination (see Chrysanthou, 2007). The union
status determination models reveal that while male employees in white collar occu-
pations during (1991-1996) display a greater degree of union aversion, highly skilled
male employees within the public sector are more likely to be union members. This
outcome is reinforced by the respective (1997-2002) estimates suggesting that the
public sector, which still remains heavily unionised, does not seem to share the fate
of the British manufacturing industry in terms of rapid deunionisation. Moreover,
the reduced form estimates suggest that the role of habit persistence (i.e. the be-
havioural e¤ect of remaining in unions due to experiencing unionisation in the past)
has diminished relative to that of unobserved heterogeneity that appears to play
an even more important role in determining individual unionisation propensity in
the second period estimates. Thus, it seems plausible that the greater proportion
of highly productive male employees remaining in unions during the second period,
do so because of unobserved factors such us solidarity as opposed to maximising
their earnings.
Finally, though on the basis of individual behaviour it seems reasonable to
argue that less productive employees might be more prone towards unionisation
in order to appropriate some share of monopoly rents, it appears improbable that
prot maximising employers would hire them (see Abowd and Farber, 1982; Vella
and Verbeek, 1998, p.173). Since in modelling wage determination and the union
membership decision we do not explicitly incorporate the employers role, at a
minimum we ought to investigate the impact on the estimates upon the relaxation
of the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is equally valued in each sector.
4.2. The Wage Regressions Under Unrestricted Sorting
To test whether the random components are di¤erentially rewarded in the two
sectors we modify the models by allowing the endogeneity correction terms to vary
by sector. To investigate how the random components are rewarded in each sector
more rigorously we need to examine the average wage contribution of the endo-
geneity correction terms. This is obtained by multiplying the mean values15 of the
endogeneity correction terms (Ci, Cit) by the corresponding estimates of covari-
ances (j;, j;").16
The unrestricted sorting structure estimates for males during (1991-1996), in
Table 2, reveal that the sign of the coe¢ cient on the xed individual e¤ect remains
negative as in the hierarchical structure estimates, though now it is weakly statisti-
cally signicant. Given the statistical insignicance of the interaction between the
xed e¤ect and union status the dominant e¤ect determining the sorting structure
comes from the time-variant e¤ects. The corresponding return to the time-variant
15Provided in Tables (6-9), Appendix III.
16Under unrestricted sorting we obtain a sector-invariant and a sector-variant contribution given
by the coe¢ cients on (Ci, Cit) and (Ci.Uit, Cit.Uit) respectively. For non-union employees the
latter is equal to zero as Uit = 0.
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e¤ect for union and non-union employees is negative, (1;0  0). The descriptive
statistics in Table 6 reveal that, the average contribution of the time-variant ef-
fects to the wages of union members is negative while the average contribution to
the wages of non-union members it is positive. This indicates that upon incor-
porating the role of unobserved heterogeneity union members receive a lower wage
irrespective of the sector they are located and thus sorting into union and non-union
employment seems to be done on the basis of a hierarchical structure.
Considering the (1997-2002) male estimates under unrestricted sorting (see Ta-
ble 3) the appropriate return to the xed individual e¤ect for union and non-union
employees is positive, (1;0  0). The time-variant e¤ects remain statistically in-
signicant as in the respective hierarchical sorting estimates. The mean values of
the endogeneity correction terms (in Table 7) imply that the average contribution of
the individual-specic e¤ects to the wages of union members is positive whereas the
corresponding return to the wages of non-union members is negative. Thus, union
members receive a higher wage as a result of unobserved heterogeneity, regardless
of the sector they are located in, an outcome that suggests that sorting into the
two sectors is performed on the basis of a hierarchical structure. Note the negative
coe¢ cient on the interaction between the individual xed e¤ects and union status;
while the positive coe¢ cient on the xed individual e¤ect suggests that individuals
with characteristics typically associated with higher wages are those more likely to
be in unions, the negative sector-variant xed e¤ect (though statistically signicant
at the not so stringent 10% level) implies that the standardisation of wage rates
within the union sector entails reduced human capital premia for highly skilled em-
ployees (see Abowd and Farber, 1982). This is in line with the conclusion reached in
the restricted sorting estimates of Section 4.1, that the larger proportion of highly
productive male employees remaining in unions in the second period, are likely to
do so due to unobserved factors such us solidarity as opposed to maximising their
earnings.
With regard to the female (1991-1996) unrestricted sorting structure estimates
(in Table 4) given the statistical insignicance of the xed individual e¤ect the dom-
inant e¤ect determining the sorting structure consistent with the estimates stems
from the time-variant e¤ects. The return to the time-variant e¤ect is negative for
union and non-union employees and thus, (1;0  0). According to the respec-
tive mean values for the endogeneity correction terms (see Table 8) the average
contribution of the time-variant e¤ects to the wages of union members is nega-
tive whereas the corresponding contribution to the wages of non-union members
is positive. Therefore unobserved individual heterogeneity impacts negatively on
the wages of union members, irrespective of the sector they sort themselves into.
Hence, we cannot reject the hierarchical sorting specication.
Finally, the unrestricted sorting estimates for females during (1997-2002: see
Table 5) are consistent with a comparative advantage sorting specication since
the appropriate return to the dominant xed individual e¤ect for union members is
positive whereas for non-union it is negative. Hence, sector-specic skills are nega-
tively correlated, (1;0  0). Note the negative coe¢ cient on the individual-specic
e¤ect. This indicates that employees that are the recipients of lower wages, upon
conditioning on their attributes and in the absence of trade unions, are those most
prone towards unionisation. The positive coe¢ cient on the interaction between the
xed e¤ect and union membership, however, implies that such individuals perform
relatively better in the union sector. In other words, employees perform di¤erently
within the two sectors and sort themselves appropriately so that the average contri-
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bution of unobserved heterogeneity to the wages of union and non-union members
is positive (refer to Table 9). Therefore, those with a relatively higher propensity
towards unionisation benet most from sorting themselves into the union sector. It
is plausible that employers, faced with higher union wages and an increasing female
unionisation rate, select those females that are more likely to perform better in the
union sector from the pool.
Interestingly then while during (1991-1996) the average contribution of unob-
served heterogeneity to the wages of union members, under the sorting structure
consistent with the estimates, is negative the respective contribution in the (1997-
2002) estimates is positive. In modelling union membership determinants we found
evidence that regarding union membership status, in the second period under analy-
sis, the role of habit persistence has diminished relative to that of unobserved het-
erogeneity (see Chrysanthou, 2007). Thus, concerning the male estimates it seems
that the higher proportion of highly qualied employees remaining in the union
sector during the second period, do so due to unobserved determinants such us sol-
idarity as opposed to maximising their earnings. Regarding the female estimates,
the results suggest that females that are the recipients of lower wages, control-
ling for their characteristics and in the absence of unions, have a relatively higher
propensity towards unionisation thoughout the entire period under analysis. The
greater e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity versus habit persistence during the sec-
ond period reverses the sign of average contribution to union memberswages from
negative, in the rst period, to positive so that those persisting in unions benet
most from sorting themselves into the union sector.
While the restriction that the random components are equally rewarded in the
two sectors is only rejected in the female (1997-2002) estimates we do not believe
that estimation of the remaining models by Instrumental Variables or restricted
Control Function estimators is appropriate. Primarily since the structure of sorting
into the union and non-union sectors cannot be known a priori we see no reason
why one should preclude a comparative advantage sorting structure by employing
these estimators.
Further, one should bear in mind that solely a degenerate hierarchical structure,
imposing perfect correlation between sector-specic skills, can meet the strict and
restrictive requirement of the equality of the two covariances imposed by Instru-
mental Variables and variants of the restricted Control Function estimators. These
estimators do not only require a hierarchical structure, but also that sector-specic
skills are perfectly correlated (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a, p.477).
According to the sorting structure supported by the estimates the male union
wage e¤ect17 has fallen from 9.2% in the (1991-1996) estimates to 5.8% in (1997-
2002) which is a sizeable decrease of approximately 37% (refer to Tables 2, 3). The
respective female union wage e¤ect has also fallen from 17.6% to 11.5% which is
a signicant decrease of approximately 35% (see Tables 4, 5). The corresponding
decreases in the union wage di¤erentials are not surprising given the successive
legislative changes targeted towards weakening the bargaining strength of UK trade
unions (for a detailed account refer to Stewart, 1995). The overall e¤ect of the
(1980, 1982, 1988 and 1990) Employment Acts was that the past quarter century
was an era of a dramatic decline in aggregate trade union membership and union
recognition in the UK. Nevertheless, the estimated union wage di¤erentials imply
17Given that the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the gross average hourly wage
the union wage di¤erential is obtained by e   1.
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that unions still play a non-negligible role in wage formation.
The outcome that female employees receive higher union di¤erentials is consis-
tent with the expectation that unions raise the wages of those who would have been
relatively lower paid in their absence. Further, provided that unionism is assumed
to be a normal good an employees demand for unionism is positively related to
his/her union wage di¤erential (see Chang and Lai, 1997, p.121). Therefore, the
individuals that are lower paid, in the absence of unions, for discriminatory reasons
are more likely to be prone towards unionisation (see for instance Heywood, 1990).
This is in line with the nding that, in the period under analysis, while male union
membership has been declining female union membership has been rising albeit not
markedly (see Chrysanthou, 2007).
The estimated union wage e¤ects are consistent with the recent estimates of
Blanchower and Bryson (2007) using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).18
The corresponding uncorrected OLS union wage di¤erentials of Blanchower and
Bryson (2007), using personal and industrial plus occupational controls, are approx-
imately (7.9%, 7.1%) for males and (11.2%, 8.3%) for females during (1993-2000)
and (2001-2006), respectively.19 The uncorrected OLS union wage di¤erentials
provided in Tables (2-5) are approximately (9%, 11.7%) for males and (13.5%,
12.1%) for females during (1991-1996) and (1997-2002) correspondingly. The ev-
ident continuous decline in union wage di¤erentials explains the relatively higher
uncorrected OLS estimates from the present study that uses data from an earlier
period. Note that the (1997-2002) uncorrected OLS male union wage di¤erential is
upwardly biased and this could explain the higher male union e¤ect for the second
period (2001-2006) reported by Blanchower and Bryson (2007) as opposed to our
preferred endogeneity corrected estimate of 5.8% for the (1997-2002) period.
Under the sorting structure consistent with the estimates the average contribu-
tion of unobserved individual heterogeneity20 to the wages of male union and non-
union members during (1991-1996) is approximately -4.1% and 1.8% respectively
while the corresponding gures for the (1997-2002) estimates are 3.1% and -2.8%.
The respective gures for female union and non-union members during (1991-1996)
are approximately -2.9% and 0.7% while in the (1997-2002) estimates the average
contribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity to the wages of female union
members is approximately 3.5% and for non-union members 4.1%. The signicant
contribution of unobserved heterogeneity renders the total union wage di¤erential
highly variable across individuals.
OLS di¤erentials denote the di¤erence between the average wage of those that
are actually in the union sector and the average of those employees that are lo-
cated in the non-union sector ceteris paribus. Endogeneity corrected di¤erentials
on the other hand come from a random assignment to sector (see Robinson, 1989a,
p.660).21 Given a non-hierarchical interpretation of the unobserved individual het-
erogeneity e¤ects, endogeneity corrected estimates of the union wage di¤erential
18Note that Blanchower and Bryson (2007) fail to account for the endogeneity of union status.
19Refer to the rst column of Table 4, heading C, (Blanchower and Bryson, 2007, p.17).
20This amounts to multiplying the estimated coe¢ cient on the dominant latent e¤ect, deter-
mining the sorting structure, in Tables (2-5) by the respective mean value for union and non-union
members provided in the descriptive statistics Tables (6-9) for the endogeneity correction terms.
Concerning the calculations with respect to the female estimates for (1991-1996) and (1997-2002)
see also footnotes 14, 12 correspondingly.
21Note that there are no individuals who are randomly assigned. Random assignment refers to
controlling for the unobservables underlying the unionisation decision which are correlated with
the wage rate (see Vella and Verbeek, 1999a, p.474).
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may be higher than the uncorrected pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates (Robin-
son, 1989a, p.665).
This is, of course, at odds with the orthodox view that prot maximising es-
tablishments within a unionised sector will select the best employees thus inating
the OLS estimate of the union wage di¤erential (e.g. Abowd and Farber, 1982;
Freeman, 1984). However, this will only result in an upward bias for OLS under
a hierarchical sorting structure of omitted ability when the average contribution of
unobserved individual heterogeneity to the wages of union members is positive as
is the case with the (1997-2002) male estimates in this study. Note that while we
do recognise that the estimation methodology used fails to explicitly account for
employersbehaviour we favour the interpretation that the greater proportion of
highly productive male employees remaining in unions during the second period do
so because of unobserved determinants such us solidarity as opposed to maximising
their earnings, rather than the selectivity argument.
As the average contribution of unobserved heterogeneity to the wages of male
and female union members during (1991-1996) is negative, so that they receive
lower wages irrespective of the sector they are located in, this reverses the direction
of the OLS bias from positive to negative despite that the data are consistent with
a hierarchical structure. Under the comparative advantage sorting structure consis-
tent with the (1997-2002) female estimates the endogeneity correction methodology
produces a slightly lower, rather than higher according to Robinson (1989a), union
e¤ect relative to OLS. This stems from the fact that though the average contri-
bution of unobserved individual heterogeneity to the wages within both sectors is
positive, the respective contribution to the wages of non-union members is higher
compared to that of union members.
Recalling that the estimated union e¤ect under Fixed e¤ects assumptions is
markedly low, so that it provides the lower bound, the endogeneity correction
procedure employed yields a discernible pattern of estimates of the union wage
di¤erential relative to OLS and Fixed e¤ects. Hence, it does contribute to our
understanding of the union wage impact puzzle. This conicts with Freeman and
Medo¤ (1982) and Lewis (1986) and is in line with Robinson (1989a) and Vella and
Verbeek (1998).
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Using data from the BHPS (1991-2003) we employ a dynamic model of union
status and wage determination to estimate the wage impact of UK trade unions.
The ndings suggest that the unobserved factors that inuence union membership
also a¤ect the wage impact of unions.
It is worth noting that the major restriction of the estimation methodology used
is that we fail to adequately control for employer characteristics while on the other
hand, individual employees attributes are allowed to be an integral part of the
employers decision making process. In the models presented employer attributes
are captured through the industrial classication dummies and establishment size
controls but, these are not su¢ cient so as to assign any specic e¤ects purely to
unobserved heterogeneity (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998, p.164). Further, it is likely
that the paucity of employer controls might be biasing upwards the union wage
impact since unionised establishments tend to pay more for reasons not directly
linked to union membership (see Blanchower and Bryson, 2007, p.7).
According to the sorting structure supported by the estimates the male union
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wage e¤ect has fallen from 9.2% in the (1991-1996) estimates to 5.8% in (1997-2002),
whereas the corresponding female union wage di¤erential has fallen from 17.6% to
11.5%. The higher union wage di¤erentials accruing to female members are consis-
tent with the expectation that unions raise the wages of those who would have been
relatively lower paid in their absence. Furthermore, the signicant contribution of
unobserved heterogeneity renders the total union wage di¤erential highly variable
across individuals.
The observed decrease in the union wage impact is in agreement with our ex-
pectations following the successive legislative changes (1980, 1982, 1988 and 1990
Employment Acts) targeted towards weakening the bargaining strength of trade
unions in the UK. The estimated union wage di¤erentials imply that unions still
play a non-negligible, though diminishing, role in wage formation. Further, the es-
timated union wage e¤ects are consistent with the recent estimates of Blanchower
and Bryson (2007) using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).
The endogeneity correction procedure employed reveals that during (1991-1996)
the average contribution of unobserved heterogeneity to the wages of union mem-
bers, under the sorting structure supported by the estimates, is negative whereas
the corresponding contribution in the (1997-2002) estimates becomes positive.
The reduced form models for union status determination suggest that concerning
union membership in the second period under analysis the role of habit persistence
(i.e. the behavioural e¤ect of remaining in unions due to experiencing unionisa-
tion in the past) has diminished relative to the impact of unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, regarding the male estimates it seems plausible that the higher propor-
tion of highly skilled employees remaining in the union sector in the second period,
do so due to unobserved determinants such us solidarity as opposed to maximising
their earnings. Concerning the female estimates, the results indicate that recipi-
ents of lower wages, controlling for their attributes and in the absence of unions, are
more likely to seek union employment during the whole period under analysis. The
greater impact of unobserved heterogeneity versus habit persistence during the sec-
ond period reverses the sign of the average contribution to union memberswages
from negative, in the rst period, to positive so that those remaining in unions
benet most from their sorting decision.
The nding that higher paid employees are less prone towards unionisation,
excluding the (1997-2002) male estimates, is in accordance with insider-outsider
theories (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986) indicating that groups of highly qualied
employees do not need to rely on unions to gain higher wages since they can be
valuable assets to employers (see Blanchower el al, 1990). It is also consistent
with Abowd and Farbers (1982) argument that the standardisation of wage rates
through the bargaining process suggests that those with higher levels of human
capital would be less likely to join unions as it would entail reduced human capital
premia. Moreover, this is in line with the conclusion reached by Robinson (1989a)
and Vella and Verbeek (1998) that there is no supporting empirical evidence that
more able employees are selected from a queue to join unions.
The endogeneity correction procedure employed yields a discernible pattern rel-
ative to OLS and Fixed e¤ects and therefore contributes to our understanding of
the union wage di¤erential puzzle. This refutes the pessimistic conclusions reached
by Freeman and Medo¤ (1982) and Lewis (1986) and is in agreement with Robinson
(1989a) and Vella and Verbeek (1998).
The estimated union e¤ect under Fixed e¤ects assumptions is notably low and
provides the lower bound; an outcome which is consistent with the general consensus
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in the union e¤ects literature that the longitudinal estimates of the union wage
impact are lower than the cross-sectional estimates (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Robinson,
1989a; Jakubson, 1991; Vella and Verbeek, 1998).
We conclude that OLS estimates of the union wage e¤ect will be biased upwards
solely under a hierarchical sorting structure of omitted ability given a positive
average contribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity to the wages of union
members as is the case with the (1997-2002) male estimates. Since the average
contribution of unobserved heterogeneity to the wages union members during (1991-
1996) is negative, so that they receive lower wages regardless of the sector they
sort themselves into, this reverses the direction of the OLS bias from positive to
negative even though the data are consistent with a hierarchical sorting structure.
While under the comparative advantage sorting structure consistent with the (1997-
2002) female estimates the endogeneity correction procedure produces a slightly
lower, as opposed to higher, union e¤ect relative to OLS this does not conict
with Robinson (1989a). This occurs in that, while the average contribution of
unobserved heterogeneity to the wages in both sectors is positive, the corresponding
contribution to the wages of union members is lower to that of non-union members.
Future work could involve investigating the impact of measurement error in
union membership status on the union wage di¤erential estimates. Nevertheless,
though an interesting exercise, proving that OLS and Fixed e¤ects estimators bound
the true impact of unions on wages when both estimators produce biased results
might not be an attractive research direction.
The probability of employment within the union sector is treated as a function
of the single index (of observed and unobserved characteristics) appearing in the
reduced form union membership model. Given that we employ fairly heterogeneous
samples it is likely that our methodology is restrictive in that sorting into union
employment is expected to follow a multiple indices rule (see Abowd and Farber,
1982; Card, 1996; Vella and Verbeek, 1998). Provided that the union wage e¤ect
may vary with an employees skill level, and that the selection process into the
union sector may give rise to di¤ering selection biases at di¤erent skill levels, future
work should entail estimating separately the models for distinct skill groups (see
Card, 1996, p.969). This, however, will be rather costly in terms of sample sizes.
Finally, another interesting extension could entail comparing the estimates to
the recent bias-corrected estimator for nonlinear panel data o¤ered by Fernandez-
Val and Vella (2007) that estimates the reduced form model by Fixed e¤ects pro-
cedures in order to obtain estimates of the time-variant heterogeneity driving the
selectivity bias. This estimator does not use the independence axiom of the random
e¤ects, with respect to the explanatory variables, and avoids parametric assump-
tions for the unobserved individual heterogeneity.
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6. APPENDIX I: DERIVATION OF THE ENDOGENEITY CORRECTION
TERMS
Following Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999b) we use the assumption of joint nor-
mality to derive the expectation of ej;it in (eq:5) conditional on the composite error
it from the reduced form model and the vector of exogenous variables xit. Employ-
ing the standard formulae for the conditional expectation of normally distributed
vectors:
E(j;ijxit; i) = j;

T
2 + T
2

 
i

(A1)
E("j;itjxit; i) = j;"

 2 it  
T2
2(
2
 + T
2
)
 
i

(A2)
To obtain the conditional expectations, given the t-dimensional vector Ui, we
replace i in (eq:A1; A2) by their conditional expectations given Ui. Using the rst
law of iterated expectations:
E(itjxit; Ui) = E(#i + itjxit; Ui) = E#i [#i + Efitjxit; Ui; #ig] (A3)
=
Z 1
 1
[#i + E(itjxit; Ui; #i)]f(#ijxit; Ui)d#i
where f(#ijxit; Ui) is the conditional density of #i.
Given the assumption of the strict exogeneity of xit the conditional distribution
of #i is:
f(#ijxit; Ui) = f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i)
f(Uijxit) (A4)
Substituting expression A4 into A3 we arrive at:
E(itjxit; Ui) = 1
f(Uijxit)
Z 1
 1
[#i + E(itjxit; Ui; #i)]f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i)d#i = (A5)
=
1Z
f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i; xit)d#i
Z 1
 1
[#i + E(itjxit; Ui; #i)]f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i)d#i
where we have used f(Uijxit) =
R
f(Uijxit; #i)f(#i; xit)d#i and Efitjxit; Ui; #ig
denotes the cross-sectional generalised Probit residual (see Gourieroux et al, 1987)
obtained from the rst step estimates of the reduced form model:
E(itjxit; Ui; #i) = (2Ui   1)

f(2Ui   1)(0	it + i)=g
f(2Ui   1)(0	it + i)=g

(A6)
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7. APPENDIX II: ESTIMATION OF THE ENDOGENEITY CORRECTION
TERMS
The term in the denominator in expression A5 is the likelihood contribution
for individual i. Given the parameter estimates from the reduced form model
1 = (1; 2; #i) we can approximate expression A5 using quadrature methods or
simulation (numerical integration).
To estimate the simulated counterpart of A5 we obtain R draws of #
r
i from
f(#ij#i) = N(0; #i) and compute the corresponding log-likelihood for individual
i conditional on the draw:
f(Uijxit; #ri ) =
TY
t=1
f(Uitjxit; #ri ) (A7)
To provide a better coverage of the integrals we use randomised Halton draws
since the asymptotic properties of simulation-based estimators are obtained under
the assumption of randomness.22 Supplementing these with antithetic draws23 we
induce a negative correlation over observations thus, further improving the coverage
(see Train, 2003; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006). The procedure is repeated R
times and averaging over these replications we obtain the simulated log-likelihood
function:
f(Uijxit; #ri ) = ln
1
R
RX
r
f(Uijxi; #ri ) (A8)
Estimators obtained by maximising likelihoods that are approximated by sim-
ulation techniques are known as MSL estimators and have the same large-sample
properties as maximum likelihood, if the number of repetitions used to approxi-
mate the integral grows at a higher rate than the square root of the number of
observations in the sample (
p
N=R  ! 0), (see Drukker, 2006, p.153). We use 500
randomised Halton draws and 500 antithetic draws hence, R = 1000. Given the
sample sizes, N , of the estimated models presented
p
N=R  ! 0.
Train (2003, p.233) claims that 100 Halton draws provide similar estimates to
1000 pseudorandom draws though the former result in lower standard deviations
of the parameter estimates. However, having estimated the models with 100, 500
and 600 Halton draws, with and without antithetics, we found that the standard
deviations of the parameters with fewer Halton draws are not unambiguously lower
and this questions the validity of simplistic denitive statements about the trade-o¤
between estimation time and accuracy.24
Given the estimates from the reduced form model we can simulate the expression
for E(itjxit; Ui).
22Randomised Halton draws have identical properties of coverage over observations as Hatlon
draws, however, they are not systematic at least in the same manner pseudorandom numbers are
random (see Train, 2003, pp.234-235).
23Note that, Halton sequences already induce a negative correlation over observations. It is
customary however to supplement them with antithetic draws to further reduce the variance of
the simulator.
24Capellari and Jenkins (2006, p.174) reach a similar conclusion while Train (2003) himself
underlines the need for further research on the properties of Halton sequences in simulation-based
inference.
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Taking again R draws from f(#ij#i) expression A5 is approximated by:

it =
1
R
1
R
X
r
f(Uijxit; #ri )
1
R
RX
r
[#ri + E(itjxit; Ui; #ri )]f(Uijxit; #ri ) (A9)
The individual specic means E(
 
ij xit; Ui) can be computed using:   i =
1
Ti
PTi
t=1

it . Substituting the estimates for E(itjxit; Ui) and E( ij xit; Ui) into
(eq:8; 9) we obtain the endogeneity correction terms (Ci; Cit).
20
References
Abowd, J. M. and Farber, H. S. (1982). Job Queues and the Union Status of
Workers, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 35, pp. 354-367.
Arellano, M., Bover, O. and Labeaga, J.M. (1997). Autoregressive Models with
Sample Selectivity for Panel Data, Paper 9706, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y
Financieros, Madrid.
Blanchower, D. G., Oswald, A. J. and Garrett, M. D. (1990). Insider Power
in Wage Determination, Economica, Vol. 57, pp. 143-170.
Blanchower, D. G. and Bryson, A. (2007). The Wage Impact of Trade Unions
in the UK Public and Private Sectors, IZA, Discussion Paper, No.3055.
Brown, C. and Medo¤, J. (1989). The Employer Size-Wage E¤ect, Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 97, pp.1027-1059.
Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and
Applications, Cambridge University Press.
Cappellari, L. and Jenkins, S. P. (2006).Calculation of Multivariate Normal
Probabilities by Simulation, with Applications to Maximum Simulated Likelihood
Estimation, The Stata Journal, Vol. 6(2), pp.156-189.
Card, D. (1996). The E¤ect of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A Longitu-
dinal Analysis, Econometrica, 64(4), pp.957-979.
Chang, J. and Lai, C. (1997). Union Membership and Employment Dynamics
with Endogenous Union Density, Economics Letters, Vol. 57, pp. 119-125.
Chrysanthou, G. M. (2007). Determinants of Trade Union Membership in
Great Britain During 1991-2003, Discussion Paper 2007/01, University of York.
Disney, R., Gosling, A. and Machin, S. (1996). What Has Happened to Union
Recognition in Britain, Economica, Vol.63, pp. 1-18.
Drukker, D. M. (2006). Maximum Simulated Likelihood: Introduction to a
Special Issue, The Stata Journal, Vol. 6(2), pp.153-155.
Duncan, G. and Leigh, D. (1985). The Endogeneity of Union Status: An
Empirical Test, Journal of Labor Economics, 3, pp. 385-402.
Fernandez-Val, I. and Vella, F. (2007). Bias Corrections for Two-Step Fixed
E¤ects Panel Data Estimators, IZA, Discussion Paper Series No.2690.
Freeman, R. B. (1984). Longitudinal Analyses of the E¤ects of Trade Unions,
Journal of Labor Economics, 2, pp. 1-26.
Freeman, R. B, Medo¤, L. J. (1984). What Do Unions Do?, New York: Basic
Books.
Gould, W., Pitblado, J. and Sribney, W. (2003). Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mation with Stata, Stata Press.
Gourieroux, C. Monfort, A. Renault, E. and Trognon, A. (1987). Generalised
Residuals, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 34, pp.5-32.
Hausman, J. A . and Taylor, W.E. (1981). Panel Data and Unobservable
Individual E¤ects, Econometrica, 41(2), pp. 263-80.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specication Error, Econo-
metrica, 47(1), pp.153-62.
Heckman, J. J. (1981a). Statistical Models for Discrete Panel Data, in Manski,
C. F., and McFadden, D. L., Editors, Structural Analysis of Discrete Data and
Econometric Applications, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Heckman, J. J. (1981b). The Incidental Parameters Problem and the Prob-
lem of Initial Conditions in Estimating a Discrete Time-Discrete Data Stochastic
21
Process, in Manski, C. F. and McFadden, D. L., Editors, Structural Analysis of
Discrete Data and Econometric Applications, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Heywood, J.S. (1990). Who Queues for a Union Job?, Industrial Relations,
Vo.29, pp. 99-127.
Jakubson, G. (1991). Estimation and Testing of the Union Wage E¤ect Using
Panel Data, Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 971-991.
Jovanovic, B., and Mo¢ tt, R. (1990). An Estimate of a Sectorial Model of
Labor Mobility, Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp.827-852.
Krishnakumar, J. (1996). Simultaneous Equations: Simultaneous Error Com-
ponent Models with Censored Endogenous Variables in Mátyás, L., Sevestre, P.
(Eds.), The Econometrics of Panel Data: A Handbook of the Theory with Appli-
cations, 2nd rev. ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lee, L. (1978). Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model
with Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables, International Economic Re-
view, 19, pp. 415-433.
Lewis, H. G. (1986). Union Relative Wage E¤ects: A Survey, Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Lindbeck, A. and Snower, D. (1986) Wage Setting, Unemployment and Insider-
Outsider Relations, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 76, pp.
235-239.
Maire, D. and Schjerning, B. (2007). Earnings, Uncertainty, and the Self-
Employment Choice, Discussion Paper 2007-04, CEBR.
Newey, W. K. (1984). A Method of Moments Interpretation of Sequential
Estimators, Economics Letters, 14, pp. 201-206.
Newey, W. K. (1987). E¢ cient Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable
Models with Endogenous Explanatory Variables, Journal of Econometrics, Vol.
36 (3), pp. 231-250.
Orme, C. D. (2001). Two Step Inference in Dynamic Non-Linear Panel Data
Models, School of Economic Studies, University of Manchester, mimeo.
Pagan, A. and Vella, F. (1989). Diagnostic Tests for Models Based on Unit
Record Data: A Survey, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 4, pp.29-60.
Robinson, C. (1989a). The Joint Determination of Union Status and Union
Wage E¤ects: Some Tests of Alternative Models, Journal of Political Economy,
97, pp. 639-667.
Robinson, C. (1989b). Union Endogeneity and Self-selection, Journal of Labor
Economics, 7(1), pp.106-12.
Stewart, M. B. (1995). Union Wage Di¤erentials in an Era of Declining Union-
ization, Oxford Bulletin of Economics & Statistics, Vol. 57, pp.143-66.
Stewart, M. B. (2006). -redprob- A Stata Program for the Heckman Estimator
of the Random E¤ects Dynamic Probit Model, University of Warwick, mimeo.
Stewart, M. B. (2007). The Inter-related Dynamics of Unemployment and Low-
Wage Employment, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 22(3), pp. 511-531.
Swa¢ eld, J. (2001). Does Measurement Error Bias Fixed-E¤ects Estimates of
the Union Wage E¤ect?, Oxford Bulletin of Economics & Statistics, Vol. 63, pp.
437-457.
Topel, R. H. and Ward, M.P. (1992). Job Mobility and the Careers of Young
Men, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, pp.439-79.
Train, K. E. (2003). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
22
University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, British House-
hold Panel Survey; Waves 1-12, 1991-2003 [computer le]. Colchester, Essex: UK
Data Archive [distributor], SN: 4967, June, 2004.
Vella, F. and Verbeek, M. (1998). Whose Wages Do Unions Raise? A Dynamic
Model of Unionism and Wage Rate Determination for Young Men, Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 13(2), pp.163-183.
Vella, F. and Verbeek, M. (1999a). Estimating and Interpreting Models with
Endogenous Treatment E¤ects, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 17, pp.
473-478.
Vella, F. and Verbeek, M. (1999b). Two-step Estimation of Panel Data Models
with Censored Endogenous Variables and Selection Bias, Journal of Econometrics,
90, pp. 239-263.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2005). Simple Solutions to the Initial Conditions Problem
in Dynamic, Nonlinear Panel Data Models with Unobserved E¤ects, Journal of
Applied Econometrics, Vol. 20, pp.39-54.
23
8. APPENDIX III: TABLES
                                                                                               TABLE 1
               Descriptive Statistics
1991-1996 1997-2002
Gender Male Female Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Log of Hourly Wage 2.073 0.464 1.746 0.472 2.264 0.466 1.995 0.461
Trade Union Membership 0.4099 0.492 0.3173 0.465 0.3471 0.476 0.3474 0.476
Log (1+Potential Experience) 3.223 0.634 3.166 0.715 3.558 0.456 3.544 0.467
Marital Status 0.692 0.462 0.683 0.465 0.665 0.472 0.642 0.479
Full-Time Employment _ _ 0.672 0.469 _ _ 0.709 0.454
Maternity Leave _ _ 0.011 0.104 _ _ 0.013 0.113
Black (Caribbean, African, Other) 0.001 0.035 0.005 0.068 0.002 0.047 0.006 0.079
Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.014 0.116 0.008 0.090 0.013 0.113 0.013 0.111
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.009 0.093 0.005 0.068 0.007 0.080 0.005 0.072
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.300 0.458 0.300 0.458 0.269 0.444 0.282 0.450
South West 0.097 0.296 0.070 0.255 0.094 0.291 0.095 0.293
Midlands 0.167 0.373 0.158 0.365 0.192 0.394 0.172 0.377
Scotland 0.078 0.269 0.097 0.296 0.078 0.268 0.089 0.285
Wales 0.053 0.224 0.047 0.211 0.056 0.230 0.050 0.219
North West 0.110 0.313 0.112 0.316 0.102 0.303 0.111 0.315
North East 0.150 0.358 0.175 0.380 0.170 0.376 0.160 0.366
East Anglia 0.044 0.205 0.041 0.198 0.040 0.195 0.041 0.198
University Degree or Higher 0.158 0.365 0.109 0.312 0.169 0.375 0.133 0.340
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.082 0.274 0.074 0.263 0.087 0.281 0.078 0.268
A Levels 0.239 0.426 0.155 0.362 0.267 0.442 0.225 0.418
O Levels or CSE 0.333 0.471 0.426 0.495 0.345 0.475 0.409 0.492
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.157 0.364 0.199 0.399 0.181 0.385 0.206 0.404
Workforce >500 0.213 0.410 0.156 0.363 0.206 0.405 0.173 0.379
Workforce 100-499 0.303 0.460 0.228 0.419 0.297 0.457 0.213 0.409
Workforce 25-99 0.271 0.445 0.275 0.447 0.248 0.432 0.271 0.445
Workforce <25 0.213 0.409 0.340 0.474 0.249 0.432 0.343 0.475
 Industrial Classification Dummies
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 0.016 0.125 0.006 0.080 0.006 0.078 0.005 0.067
Energy and Water Supplies 0.051 0.220 0.007 0.085 0.025 0.155 0.007 0.083
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals 0.052 0.221 0.018 0.134 0.053 0.225 0.014 0.116
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries 0.156 0.363 0.050 0.219 0.138 0.345 0.030 0.171
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.122 0.328 0.067 0.250 0.151 0.359 0.062 0.241
Construction 0.044 0.204 0.006 0.076 0.055 0.227 0.006 0.079
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) 0.116 0.320 0.177 0.382 0.122 0.327 0.185 0.388
Transport & Communication 0.091 0.288 0.030 0.171 0.105 0.307 0.036 0.187
Banking & Finance 0.134 0.341 0.153 0.360 0.143 0.350 0.154 0.361
Public Administration, Education, Other 0.219 0.414 0.484 0.500 0.202 0.401 0.502 0.500
Occupational Classification Dummies
Professional Occupations 0.124 0.330 0.107 0.310 0.098 0.297 0.106 0.308
Managers & Administrators 0.180 0.384 0.097 0.296 0.196 0.397 0.120 0.325
Associate Professional & Technical 0.108 0.311 0.124 0.329 0.110 0.312 0.141 0.349
Clerical & Secretarial 0.099 0.298 0.333 0.471 0.081 0.273 0.302 0.459
Craft & related 0.182 0.386 0.026 0.161 0.202 0.401 0.021 0.143
Personal & Protective Service 0.069 0.253 0.117 0.322 0.059 0.235 0.131 0.338
Sales 0.033 0.179 0.076 0.266 0.035 0.183 0.090 0.287
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.152 0.359 0.037 0.188 0.158 0.365 0.030 0.170
Other Occupations 0.054 0.227 0.081 0.273 0.063 0.243 0.059 0.235
Number of Observations 4818 5172 5538 5760
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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                TABLE 2
                                                            Wage Regressions (1991-1996), Males
OLS Fixed Effects Hierarchical Unrestricted
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Trade Union Membership 0.086 7.51 0.037 2.88 0.088 4.19 0.068 1.96
Potential Labour Market Experience 0.123 7.16 0.422 12.41 0.146 7.06 0.137 6.51
Squared Experience 0.000 -2.91 0.000 13.00 0.000 -2.75 0.000 -2.53
Marital Status 0.143 12.35 0.009 0.40 0.135 10.80 0.135 10.59
Black(Carribean, African, Other) -0.035 -0.36 _ _ 0.006 0.05 0.012 0.11
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.036 0.90 _ _ 0.056 1.30 0.058 1.34
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.056 -1.14 _ _ -0.040 -0.73 -0.037 -0.67
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.200 12.57 0.032 0.39 0.175 10.33 0.178 10.41
South West 0.125 5.99 0.103 1.27 0.087 3.77 0.089 3.79
Scotland 0.022 1.02 -0.114 -0.83 -0.004 -0.18 0.002 0.10
Wales 0.038 1.59 0.042 0.40 0.049 1.91 0.046 1.73
North West 0.080 3.92 -0.168 -1.15 0.090 4.01 0.089 3.86
North East 0.088 4.73 0.246 1.82 0.084 4.21 0.086 4.30
East Anglia 0.092 3.31 -0.007 -0.07 0.064 2.11 0.067 2.21
University Degree or Higher 0.360 13.71 0.161 1.58 0.346 12.42 0.347 12.36
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.216 8.76 0.046 0.42 0.225 8.24 0.221 7.76
A Levels 0.180 9.48 0.204 1.92 0.185 8.99 0.184 8.89
O Levels or CSE 0.106 6.39 0.089 1.07 0.116 6.45 0.115 6.30
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health -0.018 -1.34 -0.004 -0.37 -0.026 -1.83 -0.028 -1.99
Workforce >500 0.172 10.14 0.033 1.77 0.186 9.91 0.171 8.36
Workforce 100-499 0.118 7.43 0.031 1.89 0.125 7.28 0.110 5.95
Workforce 25-99 0.086 5.31 0.023 1.47 0.084 4.80 0.074 4.17
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -0.356 -6.86 -0.256 -3.57 -0.311 -5.80 -0.308 -5.78
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals -0.244 -8.34 -0.069 -1.52 -0.235 -7.46 -0.233 -7.35
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.281 -11.45 -0.099 -2.30 -0.261 -9.78 -0.253 -9.38
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.280 -10.73 -0.089 -1.94 -0.264 -9.31 -0.261 -9.15
Construction -0.239 -7.60 -0.133 -2.78 -0.226 -6.55 -0.223 -6.45
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -0.414 -14.61 -0.189 -4.08 -0.391 -12.94 -0.390 -12.79
Transport & Communication -0.291 -10.48 -0.141 -2.97 -0.281 -9.45 -0.276 -9.20
Banking & Finance -0.140 -4.95 -0.146 -3.35 -0.133 -4.43 -0.133 -4.38
Public Administration, Education, Other -0.258 -10.53 -0.128 -2.67 -0.235 -8.96 -0.241 -8.86
Professional Occupations 0.399 13.31 -0.022 -0.53 0.398 12.02 0.410 11.91
Managers & Administrators 0.497 17.26 0.002 0.05 0.470 14.51 0.491 14.02
Associate Professional & Technical 0.400 13.77 -0.004 -0.10 0.382 11.81 0.397 11.83
Clerical & Secretarial 0.136 4.80 -0.023 -0.60 0.110 3.50 0.119 3.69
Craft & related 0.157 5.96 -0.015 -0.38 0.152 5.26 0.157 5.42
Personal & Protective Service 0.283 8.72 -0.004 -0.08 0.269 7.57 0.271 7.64
Sales 0.251 5.72 0.001 0.02 0.228 5.05 0.248 5.34
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.120 4.57 0.003 0.08 0.111 3.80 0.119 4.01
Ci _ _ _ _ -0.085 -3.23 -0.072 -1.79
Cit _ _ _ _ -0.005 -0.30 -0.196 -3.42
Ci*Union Membership _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.097 1.06
Cit*Union Membership _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.188 2.20
Ci Squared _ _ _ _ 0.230 5.48 0.219 3.57
Cit Squared _ _ _ _ 0.009 0.86 -0.122 -3.24
(Ci*Union Membership)Squared _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.117 -1.24
(Cit*Union Membership)Squared _ _ 0.148 2.12
Constant 1,145 18.98 0.164 1.11 1,083 14.98 1,109 14.69
R Squared 0.455 _ 0.455 0.457
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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                            TABLE 3
                                                           Wage Regressions (1997-2002), Males
OLS Fixed Effects Hierarchical Unrestricted
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Trade Union Membership 0.111 10.47 0.055 3.59 0.056 2.60 0.067 2.61
Potential Labour Market Experience 0.158 5.67 0.730 12.45 0.157 4.94 0.158 4.96
Squared Experience 0.000 -7.11 0.000 9.92 0.000 -5.98 0.000 -6.01
Marital Status 0.199 19.22 0.082 4.44 0.178 15.59 0.179 15.70
Black(Carribean, African, Other) 0.222 2.21 _ _ 0.201 1.68 0.211 1.80
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) -0.055 -1.14 _ _ -0.076 -1.39 -0.069 -1.25
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.023 -0.41 _ _ 0.043 0.65 0.019 0.29
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.146 10.36 0.096 0.77 0.153 10.09 0.151 9.99
South West 0.129 6.76 0.085 0.81 0.125 6.04 0.129 6.22
Scotland 0.053 2.64 -0.069 -0.50 0.046 2.04 0.051 2.24
Wales 0.002 0.09 0.057 0.67 -0.019 -0.83 -0.016 -0.63
North West 0.052 2.98 -0.074 -0.67 0.026 1.22 0.032 1.40
North East 0.002 0.13 0.032 0.34 -0.008 -0.48 -0.003 -0.18
East Anglia 0.046 1.85 0.047 0.22 0.028 1.03 0.034 1.23
University Degree or Higher 0.417 20.41 0.004 0.11 0.453 19.90 0.444 19.44
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.286 13.41 0.171 1.70 0.327 13.35 0.314 12.97
A Levels 0.170 10.57 -0.021 -0.28 0.175 9.92 0.174 9.89
O Levels or CSE 0.117 8.02 -0.157 -1.85 0.117 7.37 0.118 7.40
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health -0.053 -4.09 -0.001 -0.09 -0.042 -3.00 -0.044 -3.11
Workforce >500 0.201 13.57 0.032 1.71 0.165 9.41 0.173 9.55
Workforce 100-499 0.149 10.92 0.027 1.55 0.113 6.66 0.122 6.99
Workforce 25-99 0.067 4.93 0.011 0.71 0.032 2.09 0.038 2.45
Professional Occupations 0.411 16.15 0.062 1.94 0.397 13.89 0.403 13.97
Managers & Administrators 0.473 20.78 0.125 3.92 0.467 18.42 0.468 18.27
Associate Professional & Technical 0.428 17.01 0.066 2.00 0.417 14.81 0.419 14.75
Clerical & Secretarial 0.128 5.32 0.032 0.96 0.125 4.57 0.127 4.60
Craft & related 0.228 10.72 0.092 2.84 0.226 9.47 0.228 9.44
Personal & Protective Service 0.252 8.94 0.119 1.94 0.240 7.68 0.245 7.74
Sales 0.304 9.51 0.095 2.26 0.293 8.45 0.292 8.41
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.152 7.03 0.046 1.48 0.148 6.10 0.150 6.13
Ci _ _ _ _ 0.176 3.22 0.276 3.22
Cit _ _ _ _ 0.004 0.27 0.013 0.69
Ci*Union Membership _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.273 -1.64
Cit*Union Membership _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.019 -0.67
Ci Squared _ _ _ _ -0.595 -2.81 _ _
Cit Squared _ _ _ _ 0.002 0.11 _ _
Constant 0.949 11.27 -1.108 -5.64 1.055 10.81 1.043 10.60
R Squared 0.452 _ 0.440 0.440
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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    TABLE 4
                                               Wage Regressions (1991-1996), Females
OLS Fixed Effects Hierarchical Unrestricted
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Trade Union Membership 0.127 11.42 0.018 1.30 0.162 7.22 0.202 5.57
Potential Labour Market Experience 0.067 4.80 0.405 14.10 0.044 2.69 0.038 2.34
Squared Experience 0.000 -5.29 0.000 12.85 0.000 -3.90 0.000 -3.81
Marital Status 0.045 4.05 0.022 1.24 0.032 2.66 0.018 1.31
Full-Time Employment 0.017 1.35 -0.119 -5.57 0.001 0.05 -0.020 -1.19
Maternity Leave -0.353 -3.64 -0.402 -4.95 -0.366 -3.81 -0.379 -3.97
Black(Carribean, African, Other) 0.113 2.48 _ _ 0.084 1.69 0.057 1.12
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.108 2.30 _ _ 0.102 1.93 0.082 1.51
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.082 1.13 _ _ 0.120 1.47 0.140 1.71
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.175 11.45 0.085 1.10 0.173 10.52 0.185 10.84
South West 0.002 0.09 -0.024 -0.20 0.014 0.55 0.024 0.93
Scotland 0.091 4.63 0.406 2.67 0.074 3.55 0.057 2.63
Wales 0.073 3.23 0.154 0.88 0.060 2.44 0.035 1.30
North West 0.080 4.22 0.204 0.81 0.076 3.73 0.071 3.48
North East -0.023 -1.46 0.038 0.22 -0.033 -1.98 -0.053 -2.88
East Anglia -0.024 -0.90 0.737 3.29 -0.029 -0.99 -0.018 -0.59
University Degree or Higher 0.258 10.00 0.066 1.05 0.253 9.04 0.238 7.91
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.192 8.00 0.004 0.07 0.179 6.76 0.168 5.92
A Levels 0.083 4.73 -0.021 -0.48 0.084 4.50 0.067 3.24
O Levels or CSE 0.052 4.13 -0.063 -1.52 0.051 3.79 0.043 3.02
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health -0.041 -3.56 -0.007 -0.65 -0.042 -3.33 -0.044 -3.51
Workforce >500 0.165 11.01 0.035 1.94 0.145 8.86 0.122 7.00
Workforce 100-499 0.136 10.17 0.040 2.60 0.118 7.99 0.107 7.15
Workforce 25-99 0.077 6.33 0.015 1.06 0.064 4.89 0.057 4.28
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -0.249 -3.26 -0.062 -0.64 -0.199 -2.57 -0.186 -2.34
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals -0.064 -1.09 0.074 1.00 -0.027 -0.46 -0.004 -0.07
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.171 -3.36 0.045 0.68 -0.156 -3.05 -0.143 -2.73
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.232 -4.40 -0.008 -0.12 -0.218 -4.08 -0.205 -3.80
Construction -0.170 -2.46 0.049 0.57 -0.168 -2.51 -0.165 -2.34
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -0.364 -7.22 0.007 0.11 -0.357 -7.06 -0.350 -6.79
Transport & Communication -0.176 -3.07 -0.019 -0.23 -0.166 -2.91 -0.152 -2.63
Banking & Finance -0.108 -2.20 0.012 0.18 -0.111 -2.26 -0.097 -1.92
Public Administration, Education, Other -0.182 -3.72 0.019 0.29 -0.189 -3.87 -0.187 -3.76
Professional Occupations 0.582 20.81 0.088 1.62 0.596 19.43 0.586 18.94
Managers & Administrators 0.572 21.98 0.111 2.23 0.601 21.64 0.616 21.64
Associate Professional & Technical 0.472 21.26 0.090 1.81 0.479 19.87 0.469 19.56
Clerical & Secretarial 0.274 15.44 0.077 1.58 0.287 14.88 0.294 14.95
Craft & related 0.102 2.85 0.107 1.60 0.093 2.36 0.069 1.82
Personal & Protective Service 0.122 6.04 -0.010 -0.21 0.136 6.15 0.136 6.17
Sales 0.119 4.73 -0.031 -0.62 0.126 4.48 0.148 4.98
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.001 0.02 0.060 0.83 0.016 0.46 0.019 0.56
Ci _ _ _ _ 0.013 0.54 0.103 1.62
Cit _ _ _ _ -0.081 -5.58 -0.243 -5.01
Ci*Union Membership _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.226 -1.86
Cit*Union Membership _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.158 2.27
Ci Squared _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.059 -0.55
Cit Squared _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.094 -2.75
(Ci*Union Membership)Squared _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.099 0.73
(Cit*Union Membership)Squared _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.113 1.80
Constant 1.126 17.27 -0.087 -0.64 1.253 17.76 1.324 17.12
R Squared 0.509 _ 0.516 0.518
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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 TABLE  5
                                             Wage Regressions (1997-2002), Females
OLS Fixed Effects Hierarchical Unrestricted
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Trade Union Membership 0.114 11.58 0.049 3.55 0.148 7.17 0.109 3.97
Potential Labour Market Experience 0.015 0.55 0.660 10.13 0.008 0.25 0.009 0.27
Squared Experience 0.000 -3.53 0.000 8.84 0.000 -2.96 0.000 -3.04
Marital Status 0.044 4.30 0.064 3.00 0.040 3.19 0.047 3.59
Full-Time Employment 0.021 1.94 -0.074 -4.02 0.033 2.47 0.038 2.72
Maternity Leave -0.209 -2.99 -0.240 -3.75 -0.201 -2.69 -0.202 -2.70
Black(Carribean, African, Other) -0.087 -3.00 _ _ -0.075 -2.23 -0.025 -0.58
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) -0.139 -3.24 _ _ -0.132 -2.75 -0.131 -2.75
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.022 -0.35 _ _ -0.027 -0.38 -0.007 -0.10
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.171 12.10 0.033 0.56 0.160 9.05 0.153 8.49
South West 0.055 3.28 0.031 0.39 0.041 2.18 0.037 1.94
Scotland 0.087 4.47 0.305 1.77 0.081 3.79 0.087 4.04
Wales 0.073 2.96 0.113 1.19 0.085 3.02 0.105 3.59
North West 0.061 3.56 0.125 0.87 0.055 2.91 0.053 2.77
North East -0.005 -0.31 -0.007 -0.15 -0.001 -0.06 0.005 0.29
East Anglia -0.027 -1.10 -0.042 -0.28 -0.039 -1.40 -0.046 -1.63
University Degree or Higher 0.315 14.43 0.380 3.73 0.345 14.24 0.358 14.18
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.232 10.48 0.312 2.53 0.258 10.15 0.268 10.33
A Levels 0.115 6.90 0.135 1.29 0.145 7.67 0.151 7.85
O Levels or CSE 0.087 6.24 0.089 1.14 0.097 6.26 0.098 6.35
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health -0.047 -4.19 -0.005 -0.45 -0.048 -3.80 -0.048 -3.86
Workforce >500 0.165 12.33 0.059 2.75 0.170 10.85 0.176 11.04
Workforce 100-499 0.166 12.96 0.056 3.22 0.171 11.65 0.176 11.83
Workforce 25-99 0.101 8.18 0.036 2.51 0.097 7.12 0.099 7.29
Professional Occupations 0.419 14.66 0.069 1.80 0.398 12.37 0.405 12.54
Managers & Administrators 0.444 16.95 0.095 2.73 0.436 15.35 0.434 15.22
Associate Professional & Technical 0.400 16.37 0.086 2.33 0.394 14.56 0.396 14.62
Clerical & Secretarial 0.223 10.32 0.018 0.52 0.212 8.97 0.212 8.97
Craft & related 0.100 2.93 0.002 0.03 0.115 3.12 0.115 3.12
Personal & Protective Service 0.034 1.44 -0.045 -1.28 0.028 1.08 0.030 1.14
Sales -0.088 -3.51 -0.108 -2.80 -0.090 -3.27 -0.092 -3.32
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.031 0.97 -0.030 -0.61 0.021 0.60 0.022 0.62
Ci _ _ _ _ -0.115 -2.42 -0.282 -3.13
Cit _ _ _ _ -0.027 -1.59 -0.024 -1.22
Ci*Union Membership _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.451 2.65
Cit*Union Membership _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.020 0.79
CiSquared _ _ _ _ 0.375 2.12 _ _
CitSquared _ _ _ _ -0.001 -0.05 _ _
Constant 1.336 16.71 -1.240 -5.94 1.344 13.81 1.318 13.39
R Squared 0.465 _ 0.461 0.462
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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   TABLE 6
                 Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Correction Terms (1991-1996), Males
                                Union Members                            Non-Union Members
Latent Effect Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ci 0.481 0.229 -0.213 0.252
Cit 0.265 0.402 -0.093 0.391
Ci Squared 0.284 0.207 0.109 0.139
Cit Squared 0.232 0.582 0.162 0.544
   TABLE 7
                 Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Correction Terms (1997-2002), Males
                                Union Members                            Non-Union Members
Latent Effect Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ci 0.178 0.090 -0.161 0.097
Cit 0.182 0.385 -0.056 0.393
Ci Squared 0.040 0.040 0.035 0.030
Cit Squared 0.181 0.421 0.158 0.368
   TABLE 8
                 Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Correction Terms (1991-1996), Females
                                Union Members                            Non-Union Members
Latent Effect Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ci 0.438 0.239 -0.263 0.201
Cit 0.355 0.434 -0.089 0.364
Ci Squared 0.249 0.229 0.110 0.122
Cit Squared 0.314 0.567 0.140 0.422
   TABLE 9
                 Descriptive Statistics, Endogeneity Correction Terms (1997-2002), Females
                                Union Members                            Non-Union Members
Latent Effect Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ci 0.206 0.125 -0.147 0.116
Cit 0.240 0.398 -0.091 0.402
Ci Squared 0.058 0.060 0.035 0.033
Cit Squared 0.216 0.410 0.170 0.397
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